National Law School of India Review
Volume 16

Issue 1

Article 6

2004

"MADNESS AT THE MARGINS": THE PLACE OF FOUCAULT AND
DERRIDA IN THE POST MODERN CRITIQUE OF LAW
ABU MATHEN GEORGE

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsir

Recommended Citation
GEORGE, ABU MATHEN (2004) ""MADNESS AT THE MARGINS": THE PLACE OF FOUCAULT AND DERRIDA
IN THE POST MODERN CRITIQUE OF LAW," National Law School of India Review: Vol. 16: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsir/vol16/iss1/6

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in National Law School of India Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository.
For more information, please contact library@nls.ac.in.

'MADNESS AT THE MAR GINS':
THE PLACE OF FOUCAULT AND DERRIDA IN THE
POSTMODERN CRITIQUE OF LAW
Abu Mathen George*

I

Introduction

Amongst contemporary legal academia, it is often argued that many jurisprudential theories of the
past tend to reflect a characteristic "upbringing,' which is rooted in particular traditional constructions
of the nature of society and its relationship to the authority of the law - all of which are seen
through the prism of a 'discoverable and objective truth" Perhaps the most open challenge of this
nature today is offered by the postmodern school of thought, the basis of which lie in a
contemporary disenchantment with modernity; the rejection of all grand stories which promises to
understand reality perfectly and solve all its problems, in what the French philosopher Jean Francois
Lyotard calls an "inweda/ty towards all meta-nanadwtas'"'
While most postmodernists dealt in the realm of abstract philosophy, arguing for a rethinking of the
Enlightenment Project," which had broken down, others moved into literary criticism and social
sciences. Obliterating constructions based on presumptions, these thinkers attempted to show that
those premises were themselves rooted in subjective representations rather than the fiction of
objective truth.' Soon after, many began to inquire into the possibility of applying their techniques in
an examination of the law, given its close relationship with society, and the manner in which law
operated at the general level. The considerable impact of Enlightenment thought on the formulation
of law, whether in the understanding of law as merely a science,' or in many of the assumptions that
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Jerry Goodman., A Reien' of American 12,a5l Thoghiftom Premodernin in Postmoderim, 36 TULsA L.J. 231, 234 (2(0)).
These include writers within Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, Feminist jurisprudence, Law and Literature.
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FitANeus LyoARt,

THE PoSTioDERN CONOTTiON: A

RrnoAr aN KNOWL.EDGE, XXiV

(

lBennington
and

Massani

trans., 1984) [Hereinafter LyoTARD].

The 'Enlightenment Project' represented the beginning of 'mets-narratives,' or grand stories which originated from the
Enlightenment Period and claimed to unify diverging thoughts and discover truth on the basis of scientific rationality.
Dawin HAnyvN, Tuu CONImoaN or PosnooERrr: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OtFCUTURAT CHxGE 27 (1989),
The course of this movement is not very clear, and others contend that postmodernism grew out of literary criticism in
the 1950's and then was adopted by art critics in the 60's and the 70's. Because of its ongins. postmodernism has conic
to mean a number of things, including the general temperament of late industrializarion per FaNDEREc JAMiESON,
PoSTatnnsRrnY OR THE CurTUAL LoGic Or LATE CAPTTALISM (1991)]. However, in the sense that I have used it in this
paper, postmodernism is the sustained critique of the doctrines evolved from the Enlightenment period - particularly,
the notion of universal ruth discoverable by practised reason.
As put forward by the Dean of Harvard Law School, Christopher Colombus Langdcll, Langdell also created the
'cAsebook method,' by which any legal concept could be broken down into smaller parts, to create an organized system
which would enable comprehension of that legal concept Douglas Litowitz, Posmodenism nithout the Pomobaie. 2 Fl.,
Coassr. I J, 41, 48 (2000)[hereinafter LITowz].
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underly common law principles, is beyond dispute? Hence began postmodernism's engagement with
law, primarily in the form of criticisms as to its underpinnings, but subsequently in the form of a
movement in jurisprudence, through continued inputs on its own understanding of law.
In this paper, the author looks at two prominent post-structuralist philosophers,' Derrida and
Foucault, and their role in the evolution of a radically new critique of law. For the philosophers, both
of whom were French, and who could draw upon the immense heritage of the continental
philosophers, the universalist claims of the Enlightenment as reflected in law represent something
more than lust immodesty; the attempt of this paper is to show that modernity's influence on the law
has resulted in powerful and debilitating hierarchies and exclusions, often rooted in fictional
assumptions, and that this is true of both the structure of the law and its interpretations. In particular
circumstances, this is even characterized by crippling violence, especially to the person fighting for
justice from the margins. Hence, the paper, while appreciating the critique, simultaneously asks the
question as to postmodernity's way out. The following therefore is the outline of the paper: In Part II
of this paper, an attempt is made to show how Foucault conceptualizes power and its subsequent
impact on legal theory - particularly on the notion of power as constitutive-of-12w. Then picking up
on legal hermeneutics via Foucault (on the limits of language), Part III tries to sketch generally the
postmodern turn in interpretative theory, paying particular attention to emerging 'deconstructive'
practice, as per Derrida. Part IV looks specifically at Derrida's own use of deconstruction in
understanding law, and the challenge to its legitimacy, through his essay: The Force of Law: The Aygstcal
lmndakons of Authorin: In the concluding section, the impact of these theories on certain legal
movements is outlined, looking concurrently at the possibility of evolving a postmodern
jurisprudence.
II

Foucault: Power and the Law

Foucault, is probably most well known as the Figure that filled the academic void in French
intellectual life after Sartre,) but created a special position for himself as the explorer of power
relationships that are "invariably involved in the reality-construction process" such that human culture
creates methods regulating the behaviour of its members.'

A typical example given is that of contract theory - in contracts, is always Asneed that contracting persons are in a state
of nature, hae equal information, contract with full consent, and so on. Similarly,

private property is understood a,

given, natural aspect of human eaistence, and common law proceeds to examine the manner in which 'men' interact with

each other, with relation to propert, without ever explaining the manner of its origins. Idat 49.
Though throughout the paper, I use the words post-structuralism and post-modernity interchangeably, there CXist some
subtle differences that must be highlighted. Thinkers such as Foucault and Derrids are primarily post-structuralists,
evolving their theories a5 a reaction to the strict regimens of structuralism, especially in language, Later, the underlying
Formula of 'post-suructuralism' was broadened by JF Lyorard to embrace incredulity towards 'all grand narratives', as
'post-modernism'. The term itself was used by him in his 1984 work: LYrOTARD, SxJp note 2.
It is indeed interesting to note that rlmost all the initial thinkers inthe postmodern discourse were French, whether it was
Lyotard, Derrida, Foucualr, Deleare or Blaudriiad.

Michel Foucault, .VraMgies of Powr in Tas FoNrasA PosNouoaRsas
1995)lhcreinafter FoNTANA].
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(Walter Truett Anderson, ed.,

Maness at the Margines'
But unlike many other post-structuralist thinkers" who clearly enunciated their effort at dealing with
law, Foucault was quite ambiguous, perhaps to the point of writing nothing at all on the topic.
Therefore, one would venture to say that Foucault's understanding of law can be traced through his
discourse on something bigger, namely the idea of power. At any rate, is there an absence here that
legal scholarship must take note of? In a review article of the book Foucault and Lau, written by Alan
Hunt and Gary Wikham, Hugh Baxter parodies the authors in saying that though Foucault has written
much on the law, he expounds no legal theory." To Baxter, this absence is critical to legal academia.
"If we seek to brig Foucaultinto law," he asks, "mart we notfirst bring law into Foncaul?"II
The question is left unanswered while Hunt and Wikham pursue another aspect of the study of
Foucault - which of his theories could lead to an understanding of law, and therefore which
'Foucaull must we select?" Here, the Foucault that Hunt and Wikham prefer is that of 1975-77 who
developed his "analytics of power" through three major works Dirajpineand Pzunirh, The Hitory of
Sexwad4, Volume I, and Power/Knowledge They contended that the law formed an important 'mnorf in
these works.' Using Hunt and Wikham's formulations as a basis, the author shall first sketch
Foucault's understanding of law in relation to power, and then look to reasons why it may not be a
convincing critique.

A

Power as Productive; As Counter-law

Foucault's nomenclature of traditional understanding of power as 'juridico-discursive,' or the juridical
notion of power, is a good place to begin the search for his understanding of law." This idea, he says,
formulated on account of the victory of the monarchies of Europe, was inextricably linked to
sovereignty. The principal features of this juridical notion were:

Foucault himself would probably contend such a classification. He attempted to evade classification at every stage of
his intellectual career. At one point he even remarked, "I hae never been a Freadehan I have never been a Alif-.rt. I hbaveneor
been a stremarlist.Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same. Lave it to the hereaucraty to see that ourpapers
are in order." [d at 36.
ALAN HowNT AND GARY WicKHAM, FoucAurr AND LmawToroios A SocIoLOGY Or Lw As GOvERI\NCE, vinI,

(1994). Foe

other Foucault-ian influence in legal writing See. Mark Barenberg, Demoni-y and Domianaion in the Law of ['orkplace
Coopewdoen: Prom Bureatieralie to Flexibk Pradinfedo 94 COLUM L REV. 753 (1994); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Prig
Prinie,92 Cotp. i. L. REx% 1431(1992).
Hugh Baxter, Bringing Forcaediinto Lw and Law into Fonarit,48 STAN. L Rev. 449, 450 (1996) [hereinafter BAXTRa.
Foucault's theories primarily concerned 'rules of exclusion,' that operated in societ. In his two principal works, he looked
at the distinction between the 'sane' and the 'insane' (Madnea and Gidkaion, 1961) and the separation of society int the

criainal ad the ordinary (Disar~ie and Penish: The Birth of the Prison, 1975). His other works include a histnry of
sexualii, (A His/or of Sexuadit, 1976) and a history of the discourse of knowledge (Ardbmeology of Knowedge).
The question assumes importance when one observes that Foucault's intellectual career rapidly changed course during his
lifetime, and his principal interests varied. For example, the 'power' that was his principal concern during 1972-77 becanme
power 'linked to the discourse of truth' at the end of that very decade and later transformed to examining the role of the
AND
subject (of power). Michel Foucaulk, The Subjert and Peer, in MNicnl. FOLCAULT: BEYOND STRruisTALtas
HanauTcs 237 (Dreyfus & Rabinow ed.) ("It is ipmtfewer brit the subjec, which is the guoral iheme of my research.").
BAXTR, Sor note 12, at 451.
MicHEL FoUcAUT, THE

iSroay OF Saxxiuryi

A

INTRoocrioN 82 (Robert Hurely trans., 1990) [hereinafter Svxu Arr].
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power was negative and prohibitory,"
it was issued as a legalcommanal

(iii)

it was issued from the sovereign to the subject, and

(iv)

it was homogenous in its manifestations.

(i)

2004

Is such an understanding helpful in positioning power in the present day? Foucault argues no, because
it misunderstands and misrepresents the real nature of power. Instead, he puts forward an analytics
of power,' which attempts a historical mapping of power, showing that there are technologies of
power that operate outside the fiamework of sovereignty" and are "irreducible to representations of

lan."20
But before this, why the 'analytics of power' and not just a 'theory of power'? The effort must be, as
he explains, not to relate to power as a substantive entity and explain its properties as a theory of
power would do, but merely to show where power is present and how it works? A theory of power
would identify locations and posit targets, but in Foucault's understanding that power is diffused
everywhere. It does not have a source and therefore he does not concern himself with power
(residing) with the sovereign, but rather "power at its extremities."' So, the effort is to begin at the
local level, and work with the "microphysics of power."' In displacing the traditional notion of
power as sovereign command, Foucault emphasizes that power relations include not just the
application of force, but also resistance. For Foucault, the very existence of power relations "depends
on a multiplicity of points of resistance,,"" and to analyze power is to map the dense network of
forces, including resistance, which are at play in a given context.
To return to the 'technologies of power' that operate outside the framework of sovereigntyl Foucault
in Disabbhe and Punish tries to show the historical relationship between the traditional notion of power
and the modern forms of power that emerged in the 17" century which he calls 'disciplinary
power.' 6 For him, out of this transformation, arises the opposition between law-as-sovereign-power,
on one hand, and disciplinary power on the other." While sovereign power, as previously mentioned,
is repressive and negative in character, disciplinary power is meant to act on the human body and is
primarily an effort to make it more productive and useful. Disciplinary power uses three techniques,
namely, "hierarchical observation", "normalizing judgment" and "examination" for these purposes."

fle describes this nature of power as
eiter." Id at B5.

'*wapableof doing aything, excpt to render what it dominates impahk of deing awthing

1BAXTER, S'ptm note 12, at 452. Even in todays Constitutional monarchies, notions like "the monarch is above the law' -anl
the "monarch as the fountain of justice" only explain this notion.
Idat 453.

SEXUALI,

.Iafm note 16, at 82.

Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, repnnted in POWRa/KNow-cDanE: SLECTED INTBRviBws AND OTAER WRTINs
78, 96 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon ct l1 trans., 1980) lhereinafer POWER/KNowLEDGE .
MiCHEL Foucuar, DisCwurNE AND Puais.:

SEXUALn SUpra note 16,

BaxTe, Supra note

BaRTFi

OF THE PRISON, 26 (1997) [hcreinafter FoucAutr].

at 95 ('Whs hereit poer,Ar

ifsrsne...")

12, at 454.

-Powan/KNOW
IEDGE, Spat note 22, at 104.
Bairre, Supvnote 12, at 454.
Foucm.LT,

Sapranote

23, At 170-192.
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The first of these involves arranging individuals so as to ensure that one is always watched by another,
the second involves penalties and rewards so as to induce norm-conforming behaviour and the last is
a combination of both - surveillance in order to qualify and classify individuals?
Foucault himself explains disciplinary power in -context, with an analysis of the 'Panopticon' or
'Inspection House' which Jeremy Bentham designed in 1791," which he describes as the 'epitome of
his power-knowledge principles.'
In the Panopticon, physical repression is replaced by a gentle
structure of domination." The usefulness of these structures, which would allow discipline to be
established without the use of overt force, was so advantageous that it soon circulated within the
social body and was adopted by society's major institutions."
An important question arises here: how can any society, especially an 'Enlightenment' West which
discovered the liberties, conceive in ordering and surveillance of the type reflected in his 'disciplinary
power?' For Foucault, the answer is easy - he says that it was the generalization of discipline that
made possible the expansion of liberal forms of freedom and the formation of constitutional
democracies. Without an ordered and disciplined populace, no expansion of 'liberty' could have been
conceived." Moreover, he says that;
"law om4 creates a tisible rationalefor any action, with its fairness and equalies of status
prnded, idk the realforce at play, the disciknarypower is hiddenfrom our view and acts in
an rxtra-legalfashion.'a
This in effect, acts as a "counter-law'," underminng the formal fairness of the law However the
situation appears paradoxical - on one hand disciplinary power is the predecessor of liberties and
constitutional democracy and on the other, the law that constitutional democracy creates is in
opposition to that same disciplinary power. The author attempts to examine this problem in part B of
this section of the paper"
Baxter also brings to the fore the notion of 'bio-power' that Foucault enunciates in his HistoU of
Sexwalty." This includes both disciplinary power over bodies and 'bio-politics of the population.'
It

BAxrzn,

note 12,
Srapr1

at 43.

The Inspecuon House takes the form of circular building, with individual cells around its perimeter whose windows and

lighting are arranged so as to make their occupants clearly visible to the central inspection tower, though it remains
opaque to them. Hence, they constandy had to assume that they were under the guard's watchful, gaze without ever
knowing whether it was really so, and their actions were consequently restricted. FoucAui,, Sempr note 23, at 200.
DAvin Gnuuo, Pusswi3

r AND MooRN Socis: A Suiow IN SoctA THEORY

146, (1990) [hereinafter

GARLD.N1.

FoucauArrSpmn note 23, ac 201.
Id at 209
note 31, at 147. Garlnd says that such an argument reminds us of the Hobbesian contention that
freedom under the law implies a prior process of subjugation. Ibid.

GARL Ant ,- Spra

5f

Ibid.
FoucaTur, Sepma note 23, at 222
The matter is examined in Part B, (powcr-as-constitutive), infra
SBuAon, Stva

noe12,ir 456

YS rX cAnn.T, Sa n aore 16, ai 139
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is from this second terrain, the interplay of power and population, that Foucault moves on to
'governmentality,' or a form of government rationality that has learned to deal with the problems of
the population. Governmentality is a power "eer all and each that simultaneons/y idiidadtes and
totab.Zes."" And yet Foucault is quick to point out that he is not engaging in chronology - one that
goes from sovereignty to discipline and then to governmentality - while historiciziag the notion of
power, for that would be a misrepresentation given that in different time periods, traces of different
types of power can be seen.t Commentators such as Nikolas Rose have pointed out that he could in
fact be conceiving of a triangle between sovereignty, discipline and governmentality.Y Once again,
law becomes relevant here as a 'tool' for the enforcement of government rationality, operating on the
middle ground in this new found conception of power.
This mapping of power which Foucault attempts includes another element that has so far been
omitted: knowledge. Knowledge is constituted in direct relation to power, or rather as a product of
power and they cannot exist without some relationship to each other. So for Foucault:
..delopment of all these brancbes of knowedge can in no aip be diassodatedfrom the
exerdse of power. .... genera/f speaking, the fact that soieths can become the object of scientific
obseandon, that hunan beabaiour became, from a certain point on, a problem to be- anaredand
resolved, all that is bound up. ....... So the birth of human sciences goes
hand
adwith the
installationof new mechanisms of power.""
This would mean that fields of 'knowledge,' like psychiatry, psychology and criminology, developed
and are intimately connected with the exercise of disciplinary power, as they produce scientific 'trdhs
which would enable power to be used efficiendy and effectively. This observation is of particular
relevance when one considers that many legal classifications are understood in modern law only in
relation to their medical status - for example, the question as to who is kgally insane in a court of law is
left to the determination of the psychiatrist.
Power as Constitutive; Part-of-law

B

As mentioned earlier, the most interesting of Foucault's observations on law can be found in his
argument that law and disciplinary power are set against each other, based on his findings in the area
of discipline. It is on the basis of this that Hunt and Wikharn argue that Foucault "expels the law"
from any significant role in modern society." For them, the argument is two fold - First, Foucault
consistently relates sovereign power to law, and this is reinforced by equating "power-law" to "powersovereignty." Seconcd, Foucault attempts to show the incompatibility between sovereign power and
disciplinary power. This is so because the latter is represented as repressive and negative, while all
modern forms of power are productive and positive and are diffused throughout society. Taking the
above propositions together, it seems evident that law-as-sovereignty has no place in a society

BAxmR, , 5Apr note 12,3t

457.

An example of this is when Foucault traces the origin of governmentality, from antiquiry, to the eary liberal and current
neo-liberal trends. ibid
NT

OLAs
RosE,

ForrANA,

Potnt-S OF FrnoEsi 23 (1998).

Snpra note 9, at 40-

BAXrER. Spro note 12,

at 461
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dominated, by disciplinary power, and the expulsion of the law is therefore, a necessary
consequence.'s
It is here that the author must return to die problem encountered while conceptualizing Foucault's
disciplinary power as -counter-law': the notion that the eighteenth century development of a systemn
of rights was aided by "all those microspowers we now call the disafknes."' The paradox is in fact not a
paradox at all, if it is shown that what Foucault was suggesting is that law and discipline are
complementary, and not fundamentally opposed to each other.' If this is possible, Foucault's
understanding of disciplinary power as underlying all legal framework, and acting in opposition to it,
would be misleading. Clearly, the law does not merely rest 'atop' disciplinary power, but has an active
part in how that power is shaped and exercised; hence, it would be more appropriate to say that law
is 'consitdide of disciplinary power."
In the Lght of the above, are we to reinterpret Foucault to create our own 'Foucault' for the uses of
legal scholarship? At any rate, a re-look at Foucaulth 'expulsion' of the law or the above-mentioned
problem serves only to muddy the waters and not to clarify it. The root of the problem lies in
Poucault's understanding of 'law as the command of the sovereign' in the Austinian sense, which
excludes a large bulk of law governing the relationship between citizens and is not negative or
coercive in nature, such as contract law. Perhaps one solution would be to set aside such an
interpretation of law for a while and to use his understanding of disciplinary power to uncover the
hidden biases in the law using the tool of 'critical history' or genealogy."'
This brings us to a third aspect (after the notions of understanding power as productive, and as
constitutive of the legal framework) of Foucault's theory in its relevance for legal scholarship. 'Critical
history' or 'Genealogy,' a term that Foucault borrowed from Nietzsche, is a methodological tool; one
which takes an existing phenomenon, usually a 'ritual of power' and undertakes to uncover its history,
not for its own sake, but to understand why it has gained importance in the present." In particular,
critical history uncovers the various hidden forces and biases that shape the discourse of law, which is
itself just another social practice." The use of critical history is also invariably tied up with afourth
iopec of Foucault's theory - that of social construction of norms, practices and classifications.

'FoucAuITr,
Spe note 23, at 222.
BAxTEn, Spra note 12, at 463,
This is to say that the exercise of disciplinary power And the use of law in that regard are not always separate, with the
law acting in the visible arena, and the disciplinary power 'underneath.' At many times, law helps to constitute disciplinary
power, with both acring as one
BAXTER, Sn

note 12, at 464 See also Robert W. Gordon, CnifealLegalirioies, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 103.

This tool was in fact developed by Niearche in The Genedog of Monas Foucault acknowledges this intellectual debt
essay: Michel Foucault, Nietb, Gneagz Hisory, Lf Ta FoucAU
READER, (Paul Rabimow, ed., 1984).

in his

In a very paradoxical sense, genealogy is the 'history of the present.' Foucsult himself conducted these genealogies in an
examination of the birth of the-prison, the mentil asylum, and the human sciences, although not in the area of the law.
The cool is merely one rhe legal academic pursues in this regard So DAvin Gauu'Amo, PuisHunr ANo MOOERN 'cSOGE:
A Sruny 19 SciAlm THSoRy (1990).
Douglas Litowitz, Piaundemiwn witheT Polmibbh, 2 FL. CoAsTAL LJ. 41, 55 (2000) [hereinafter LiTowr/l
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According to Douglas Litowitz, this is an extension of Nietzsche's perception of the "extreme/fuidit' in
socialand llcargories." This is quite important when one looks at legal classifications based on racial
and sexual norms?
In both the use of critical history as a methodological tool, and the uncovering of the social
constructions of norms, the interpreter/subject has a prominent role to play, and her position cannot
be fully divorced from the process of interpretation. In this context, interpretative theory assumes
importance. Hermeneutics in a postmodern setting conceptualizes the limits of language, and
Foucault and Derrida, as two important post-structuralists figure prominently here. In the next part, it
is precisely this aspect of postmodern thought that I will attempt to understand, using first Foucualt's
understanding of interpretation and then Derrida's use of deconstruction.
III The Impact of Postmodernity on Interpretative Theory
A

The Strength of 'Etcetera'

Traditional structural thought, headed by the Structuralist movement based in France in the 1960s
attempted to synthesize the ideas of Marx, Freud, and Saussure," and say that the individual is
shaped by sociological, psychological and linguistic structures over which she has no control." Thus,
a speaker of English cannot hope to make the English words she uses mean whatever she wants, nor
does she want to, because that would impede her communication." Hence, for the structuralist, as for
the post-structuralist, "language speaks us" rather than "we speaking language." However, for
Derrida, as for Foucault, these linguistic and sociological structures and the symbols and discourses
they shaped, became influx - or constantly changing (as against the rigidity of these structures for the
structuralist) and this was their principal point of departure from the latter. t They argued that
structures of social meaning are always "unstable, indeterminate, impermanent and bitricabje situated,
constantr rbangingover tme andacquiringnew cannotaions."9

51'

Th~d

Id ia 56. The legal categorization of sexualities - homosexual v heterosexual where the latter is posited as the natural
while the former is 'unnitural,'(S377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860) is an example of such a social construction.
fundamental unit for a structuralist is a sign, The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, put forward this notion of
sign in his 1915 Coupse
linguistique generk defining it as comprising the signifier and the signified. Vivian Curran,
The

Deconur/rction,Stnuammsms And-Smitism and t/ Lass 36 B.C.L. Rev. L, 11 (1994) [hereinafter CuaRA]. However, the term
itself was coined by the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss to describe a method of applying models of linguistic
structure to the study of society as a whole, in particular to customs and myths. Though Levi-Strauss claimed inspiration
from Marx, he interpreted Marxism to be a science of society, not a guide to political action.
Roger Jones, Post Striurasm,at <wwwv hilosopher org-uk

posstrlhtm>

(last visited on October 10, 2003) [hereinafter

JONES].
For example, A person will not want the word 'cat' to mean 'tree.' Whenever she would refer to the tree, and sail 'ct,'
those listening to her would be unable to understand, and her communication would be impeded. Hence, she will only use
the word 'tree,' for the organism growing out from the earth with branches and leaves,
SJON1S,

a

Splina note 56.

JIM. Balkin, Deanstdoff' Legal Career, at :ss

ale.edu/lawvehi/balkin/articles/
(last visited on October 10, 2003) [hereinafter BA.eiNi
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In law, where often judicial and academic interpretation is constructed over minute differences
between the interpretation of words and terms, the importance of the language, and the
conceptualization of language in particular ways, must be reiterated, Indeed, an entire discipline of
study has grown around interpretation of law and legal norms. In this context, interpretative theory
or hermeneutics (initially the interpretation of sacred texts) has gained importance. What is the
impact of the above ideas to interpretative theory? How relevant is the discovery of 'hidden tmth/
through the process of interpretation in the light of postmodern theory? In this part, the author
looks at answers to this question, using the notion of limits of language in the theories of Foucalt
and Derrida.
The structuralists, though contending the impossibility of a person using language, still maintained
the objective identification of that use from an external vantage point in the hope that interpretation
would yield the right meaning. However, for Foucault and Derrida, this distinction was merely
illusory. Instead they took the argument to its logical conclusion. If the powers of language control
the speaker, rather than the speaker being able to control his language, the attempt to clarify language
is limited by its own impossibility, because in essence, we are trapped by that very language and
cannot step outside it.Y As Clarke says, we find ourselves in the paradoxical position where:
"the more av comerse, the kss w are able to discover the "end" of narradve or language. We
are less able tofind determinate meanig'
Hence, while the structuralists made excessive claims as to the existence of 'truth' and the possibility
of uncovering that truth through interpretation, the post-structuralists voiced the often silenced
dissent - that perhaps the 'unmediated access to some primordial truth' was just absent."
In effect, their claims were even more modest. If say, a story was told, passed from generation to
generation, over the course of many centuries, and a person studying this narrative would uncover
earlier and earlier versions of the same story, and would believe that such versions were 'better' and
'truer' versions than the existing one. The aim of the investigator would be to find the 'original' tale in
its pristine, untouched form. The postmodernists, though crediting the process of uncovering past
histories, would disclaim the existence of such an original, as each story was an 'original' in itself,
mediated by its language and symbol systems, and influenced and changed by its own power relations.
Moreover, the percison studying the tales would become part of the story himself, just as the
interpreter would become part of the text.
Following the above analogy, the interpreter of law (say a statute, or a decision of a court) would dig
deeper and deeper, recovering different interpretations at different stages, till she achieves her
purpose, and the process must be stopped for practical considerations.3 But is this really so? Doesn't
interpretation mean that there is a certain fixed manner in which to approach a text, and to identify/

'

6'

This dilemma was best expressed by Derrida in the famous statement: "There is noithing rdside
OF GRAMMTOLoGr 64 (Gayatri Chakravorrhy Spivak trans., 1978).

text"

JAQUEs DERRIDA,

Michaet Clark, Fouran, Gadamer and the Law: Hermenentics in Pademodern Legal Thoight 26 U Tot, L Rev 111, 112 (1994)
(hereinafter CiARK].
Lrwirac
r

Sipra note 52, a 44.

had The simple practical comiceration is that a person cannot go on interpreting ad infiniwe. She must stop at one or
other point of time.
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create its meaning? For Foucault, this is precisely the dilemma that we must grapple with. Though
there seem to be endless interpretations to a text, the law creates limits and eliminates what seem to
be impossible interpretations - to prevent the process 'from getting out of hand." This is the fear of
raajy sgufication; that the interpreter will go wherever she wishes if given a free band." By positing
the limited number of interpretations, the law also creates the fiction of truth among those
interpretations. All impossible classifications are de-classified; put into the category of 'etcetera,'"
and carefully excluded. In this manner, the law creates its own truth, and there arises the impossibility
of proposing alternate discourses, simply because it cannot fit into the phrase of the current/
dominant discourse." Hence for Foucualt
"Mpropositinmustfv/l some onetrs and complex condidons b4re it can be admittedwithin a
diajpkne; before it can be pronouncedtrue orfalse it must be. . . within tie true""
Jean Francois Lyotard carries the notion forward when he argues that all adjudications and judgments
are oppressive, and to understand law's underlying nature we should observe all those instances when
the claims of one of the parties cannot be heard by the adjudicating authority, purely because that
claim cannot be phrased to fit the discourse. To Lyotard this is the "differend," and at this point of
time justice is revealed as terror 69
This last notion, that of the differend, offers the possibility of escape from being trapped within the
discourse. It is also for this reason, that both Foucault and Derrida cannot see the situation as an
absolute. If justice is seen as terror, a change is definitely in order, and hence, for the former, hope
lies in the form of 'discursive ruptures," or instances when the discourse of law breaks free from the
manner in which it had been ordered so far, and the debate is no longer about technical questions of
how a word should be interpreted or its position in a matrix of norms, but of the general manner in
which the game has been conducted. This can happen through a variety of methods - through art
important judicial decision, through a paradigmatic enactment, or even through revolutionary
upheaval that challenges the Constitutive documents of the State." In such a 'multiple-discourse'

'

CLARK, Spr note 61, at 113-114,

The notion of 'etcecera' as the unclassifiable, emerges from a story of Borges narrated in Foucault's Order of Things, where
a Chinese Encyclopaedia classifies animals in a peculiar manner; such as bloging to the enseror sincfakon, and finall,
/etletr. The power of the etcetera is the power of the unclassifaLle. MICHEL FoUcAuLT, THE ORDER OF TwNs-s AN
ARCHAEOWGY OF THEsHIMAN ScmNes xv (1994).
*

CLARKE, Sinwa note 61, at 122.

*

Michel Foucault, The Discourrse on Lano, in T
1972).

SCLAr, SVpra note 61, at

a

Ancssotnav Or KNOsLEDGE 224, (A. M. Sheridan Smith, tan.

117,

Similar to what Thomas Kuhn called
'paradigmatic shifts,' in THr STRUCmRE Or SCIENTIIC REVoLuioNS; CrARKE, 3C!Trd

note 61, as114.
"

An example of paradigmanc change in the American context is given in John Valauri's analysis of Brown v oni
mf
Edncation. In the paper, he points to manner in which the United Supreme Court interpreted the existing version of
segregation, based on the principle of 'equal but different.' By refusing to examine minute differences in terminology, but
rather by looking at the overall question of segregation, the Court had achieved such a paradigm shift. John T
Valauri,
CoswdidonalHermennais, in THE 1NTERPRETATiVE TURN 245, 253, (David Hiley ct al. cds., 1991).
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environment, conversation (in a very metaphorical sense) does not happen in the language or the
grammar of any dominant party, but simply by listeners and speakers in their own versions of
understanding 2
But how does one identify these fissures? Can discursive ruptures be created, or must one wait for the
'natural course' of a legal discourse to run its length? Though there seems to be little writing on the
point, it seems possible that Derrida is actually proposing a model tool for identifying and exposing
these fissures through his idea of 'deconstruction'. Before attempting a more studied evaluation of
this tool in the next part of rhis section, it must be said that philosophically, both deconstruction and
hermeneutics have common roots. Both agree as to the continuity and permanence of interpretation
("we ane alajys and aheadg interpref. 7' But while hermeneutics stresses the affirmative coming into
being of meaning, deconstruction looks primarily at the limits of communication and understanding.
While Hans-Georg Gdarner,4 of the former, is concerned with the manner in which societies
continue to operate and function through its relationship to tradition and subsequent interpretation,
Derrida, of the latter, is alarmed that such a discussion does not look closely at the violence and the
deception that has legitimized those traditions."
B

Derrida's Challenge: The Use of Deconstruction

Developed initially as a method or technique for literary criticism and the interpretation of texts, and
brought to the notice of the Western English-speaking academia through the efforts of persons like
Paul de Man," deconstruction was introduced into legal circles only in the 1990's. Vivian Curran,
writing in the Boston College Law Redew, identifies the origin of Derridian thought in other Continental
philosophers like Heideggar, from which Derrida borrows the 'destrukdon of traditional ontology,'
and says that the change from Enlightenment thought was on account of the tact that
"After Auschnaty and the gulag, absurdip, barbariy,chaos and regression became part of the
perception of humanprogression;a coherent view of mankind regyiredincorporaionof profound
incoherence. 8
Noted American legal theorist J. M. Balkin, who has written much on the relationship between
deconstruction and the law, says that deconstruction became fashionable in America around the same

. The notion of interprectative 'understanding. has another completely new perception according

to

the theories of Hans-

Georg Gadamder, who claimed that each interpreter brought his own horizons of knowledge to the hermeneutical table;
and it was through an interplay between different horizons of different interpreters, or for the same interpreter, different
horizons within the history of text, that ultimately produced understanding For a more comprehensive account of his
impact on legal hermeneutics See: Francis J. Mootz III, The Ontorgial Bais of Lea Wrrnnic. A Proposed Model of
lorury Ased a Ar Won of Gadamwe Habers, and Riceur, 68 B. U. L. REv. 523 (1 8
Stephen Feldman, The Pohaks of Poarbrnfarspdena, 95 MAic L. REv. 166, 185 (1996) [hercmafter
German philosopher of the eady 20"' century, whose work on hermeneum- theory (Tras
considered to be one of the most important statements in that field.
*ErESLOAN,

Sopra note

Cuasnt, SrPra note 5t
CunssAN,

IaN].

Supra note 73, at 190-191.

55, as 5-6 Paul De Man was the had of Yale's Feench department, during
active in popultanning deconstructionCsmURU
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time as a theory known as reader-response, leading to the strange conclusion that the deconstruction
of texts would mean whatever the readers would want them to mean? 9 He says this interpretation
was particularly 'silly' because deconstruction arose as a response to the structur-alist movement. As
mentioned above, both structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers agreed that 'language spoke,' rather
than 'we speaking language,' though the latter group took issue with the former's fixed understandings
of those structures in society
The entire fulcrum of deconstruction challenges two assumptions of western philosophy. This
includes the understanding that there exists a centre to any system or structure, which is the point of
origin, and that all systems or structures are created of binary pairs of oppositions, of two terms
placed in some sort of relation to each other.' As regards the second, Derrida argues that the
creation of such a binary opposition also involves the privileging of one of those terms over the
other 0 Derrida argues that most of western philosophy has been based on one particular dichotomy
- the privileging of speech over writing, which he calls 'logocentrism." 'Logocentrism' desires a
perfectly rational language that perfectly represents the real world. Such a language of reason would
absolutely guarantee that the presence of the world, interpreted as the essence of everything in the
world, could be viewed by an observing subject, who then would be able to speak of it with absolute
certainty."
To him, the problem in this binary opposition lies in the exclusion of all that is uncertain, and the
repression of the unprivileged within that text. Through deconstruction, Derrida shows that the term
which is unprivileged against its paired term is actually part of the term in the first place, and one
does not hold without the other, and therefore the argument that they are 'different' falls apart."
Applying this notion to the interpretation of texts, one can see that any 'meaning'" that is
constructed is provisional and relative, because it is newr exhaustser, and can always be traced back to a
prior network of differences, and the antinomies" in this can further be exposed by deconstructing
them, and so on, In the legal arena, a deconstructive analysis of the public/private distinction would
reveal such a distinction to be illusory. For example, it is clear that private property is made possible
only through 'public enforcement,' which would mean that instead of understanding private property
as a personal relation between the owner of the land and the land itself, it is actually understood as a
public and social arrangement. Once the hierarchy is exposed as problematic, the stage is set for the
re-construction of new legal categories. In all such interpretation, as mentioned above, the interpreter
(or the selo is positioned within the text, unlike in structuralism, which says that there can be an

"

BAcoN, SrqpInnote 59.
JOHN LHrs, imo

"

SRUcTuAusAL

To Posio.RNiTY: Kay CONsran'oRY ThiNi<Rs 106 (1994) hereitafter LECHTEs.

Examplcs that can be shown in this regard are opposites like lght/dark, masculine/feminine etc in which the latter is
always subjected and rendered inferior to the former.

JM

a

Balkin, Natad Oppositins 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1693 (1990)

RoAcones

SLEcrTE,

Aic~tIN\Nki & CHRUs GARRYAT,INTRODOCING OsMODERNisi, 78 (1999) [hercinafter GARxATI.

Sow note 90, 107.

*

Meaning involves both identity (what it is} and difference (what it is not), and is therefore being continuously 'deferred.'
The word Derrida coined to show this tension was'differance'. GARRtA, Sigp note 83
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objective standpoint to view the discourse.
Many legal scholars discount deconstruction, arguing that it is used randomly, its purpose being
simply to destroy and debunk, rather than its use being of any discernible pattern.' Derrida's
response is that, instead of random use of deconstruction, the technique is most often used when the
manner in which words are juxtaposed throw open the possibility of different interpretations." But a
more valid, and reasoned pronouncement against deconstruction argues that its anti-foundationalism
is inherently dangerous because it questions the very manner in which we order our lives. Hence,
critics such as Hegland say that our world would become worse off if we were to perceive the Rule
of Law as an illusion." But even these criticisms stem from the misunderstanding of deconstruction
as nihilism." In effect, deconstruction only offers the possibility of multiple meanings, and is
precisely the opposite of 'an absence of meaning
IV

The Possibility of Justice

For long, Derrida had been primarily concerned with developing his notion of deconstruction in
order to attack Western rationality. Interestingly, though the technique was used by other legal
scholars, it was not used by its author himself until the last decade when he made some -interesting
forays into the aspect of law and justice using the tool of deconstruction. At the Cardozo Law School
conference in 1992, for which he writes his most important work in this context," he expresses his
9
complaint over the obligation to write something on justice, which he did not volunteer to do.
3
Mariana Valverde says that in this essay as well as his work entitled Spearer of Maic, he addresses
justice not as a conceptual idea, as in natural law, but rather as a 'praxis'. Therefore, the question for
him is: "How can we, in ourpartiadartime andplace, work towardsjurire?"
In his Force of Law," Derrida begins by pointing to the intimate connection between violence and the
law. He does so by making two assertions:

CRrw,
R
Supra note 55, at 20.
Id

"'

Kennev Flegland, Goodye to Dentridon, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1205 For other criticisms, So also Owen Piss,
esodal
O/jecidly and Interpretaeion, 34 SnN. L. Ray. 739 (1982). Fiss says that deconstruction, being nihilistic, "tbrarr
edx/ence." Another prominent 'intellectual' case against deconstruction was brought forward in JonHN Frns, AcAINsT
DECONsrucTIoN, (1989), where he claims to use the 'tools of logic' to expose the flaws in the deconstructive method.

For the postmodern response SeeJ.M. Balkin, Nested Opposiions, 99 YALE L). 1669 (1990).
Or that which rejects all available possibilities, and results in the absence of meanings
Jacques Derrida, Harre.of
LAw]|.

ate Mydcal Foundations of AuthoriM 11 CARnozo L. Rrv. 919 (1992) [hereinafter Pones Or:

John P. McCormick, Schailan Noon on Lawm and Padeis: CL
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(Peggy Kamuf trans, 1994).
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Traxis' means 'practice,' as distinguished from theory.
Maiana Valverde, DernidarJustice and Fvcault/ Freedos. Ebic4 rHisory and Soda/ Moverneu,
657 [hereinafrer VALVERDE.

24 LAS & Soc. INQunY 655,
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There is violence in the establishment of the system of justice, and

(ii) post-founding, the day to day applicability of law is marked by the coercive force which
backs it.'

Roberto Buonamano makes the connection explicit in saying: "the lawis boundap with a .iknce of its on
fon, and is se fpresernng "" The law is not in service of force, nor force in service of law, but rasher
law is seen as "founding,jusingandprerenngforce."" For Derrida, all the three are simultaneous acts,
performed at the starting point - at the origin of authority." They are also necessary, for without
one of the three, the force of the law would fall apart. Here arises Buinnamano's insistence on the
importance of silence. The silence of the founding act becomes necessary for the law as it legitimizes
itself through that act. If there were no silence, it would expose the paradox of the act, the
legitimizing of law in none other than itself and therefore the violence implicit in the founding act. 10
Hence, arises for him, the 'mystical foundations of law.'1o2
Here the question that Derrida asks, and which Valverde says Foucault evades,0 3 is whether any such
system (backed by force) is just, and if so, then aren't we not making claims as to different types of
violence, some more just than others." So for Derrida,
"What dfference is there between, on one hand,, theforce that can bejmst, or in any ca
deemed legitimate. .and on the other hand the waoleka that one a/bags deems unjust?
5
What iUajrstforce or a non- ndentJa ?'"e
This open ended style of questioning is typical of Derrida,o0 and therefore there are no immediate
answers to the question through his own method. This is because deconstruction as a relentlessli
negative method seems to preclude the possibility of taking sides, and arguing that A is just and B is

DERRDa, .tjpa note 96, at 13-

14.

Roberto Buonann, The Eamnoy of Voknee:- Dowda on Lan, and Jtiea iI RAnO JUS 16E (1998) [hereinafter
BuomNrAxo). Buonamano's statement is the third of three sweeping claims on Derrida's understandings of Law that he

makes. The other two are (1) the law always

tends

towards universality. (2) the law operates to maintain and is therefore

inseparable rom rights. bid
*

Idac 170

Denda is less clear as to what exactly constttaes a founding act, but from its relationship to authority, it would appear
that it would account for a situation where a system of

justice has initially been established.

BuooNAIAmo Supm note 98, at 170
Derrids pays particular attention to this notion in the second part of his essay, where he attempts to make sense of the

inherent violence and differentiates between mystc and mythic violence. The argument is incidental to the above
discussion.
... VAovranr, JSam note 95, at 657 Foucau,
justice is often thinly disguised force

othermse, is in agreement with Derrida in that whar goes by the name of

Mcconuic, Supa note 92, at 1707DERRIDA, 5Apa note 96, at 6.

He says it
points out the irreconcilable differences, and the permanent problematization of reason, justice, etc MecosNcir,, Syra
note 92, at 1708.

a Levi Strauss says that this style was employed by Plato, taing account of the dialogical structure of his works.
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unjust.'0 ' But does this indecision distance us from the possibihty of justice? No, says Derrida as he
is firm that: "what is current4 called deconstruction would not correpond to a quasi-nihilisicabdicaion bejore the
eaice-politcojuridicaiquestionof justice and beore the opposition betweenjut and the unust." In fact, for him,
the possibility of justice lies in leaving open that tension between justice (which is "Infinite, incalculable,
rebellious to rule, foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotopic") and the law (defined as
"rights, legitimate, stabilized, statutory, calculable and a system of regulated and coded
prescriptions.")"
So, in effect, deconstruction is exposing this tension and making possible justice through a two-step
process. At the first step, one is to adopt an "excessioe and incakwd2bk" responsibility to the question of
justice." This responsibility is to take account of the past - the origin of laws, rights and norms, and
the "apparatusrurrondrngpstke." At the second, this responsibility is not possible without a grounding
in the "expeience and expeiment of the aporia." "
Derrida concludes the first part of his essay by showing three specific aporia, or irresolvable internal
contradictions in law. In-effect, there is only one aporia: the contradiction that law claims to exercise
itself in the name of justice though justice is required to establish itself in the name of law that must
be "enftrrd" But this aporia 'infinitely distributes itself producing infinite examples." The following
are the three examples he gives of this aparis.
First, judges in writing a judgment, conserve and destroy the law at the same time. They apply
previously established rules and make new law at the point of judgment. Thus, the paradox is that on
one hand consistency is required, and on the other, each case is different and thus must be treated
differendy."'
Second, if we can understand decision as a process of learning, reading, understanding, interpreting,
and calculating the rule, the 'decision to decide' between two equally competent, though different
interpretations, belongs to the undecidable. Hence, the second aporia in the law is the 'ordeal of the
undecidable' Like a reader must always choose between corpeiung interpretations of any given text,
none of which is more 'correct' than others, similarly a judge must decide in choosing the applicable
rule of law."
Even in deciding one or the other, for Derrida that decision will not be
comprehensively just, either because it has not followed the rule, or in following it, the rule is not
guaranteed. However, one cannot suspend the decision because only a "decision is just." So the ordeal
of the undecidable is one that each judge must endure.

1u7

.

Others like Stanley Fish have argued that there is no way of distinguishing between justice and injustice except by taking
one political stance. rprm note 95, at 657.
DshoA, Sapra note 96, at 19.
Id at 22.
BuoNMANGo,Spa notc 98,at 171.
DERRIDA, Spr note 96, at 41. An aporia is an irresolvable internal contradiction in any system. In this context, I refer to
it mean a contradiction within law.
"Ifr4 note 120, at 453.
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Meconami, Spra note 92, at 1710.
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Finally, there is a second aspect to the notion that one cannot suspend a decision. This is the
imperative of urgency that judgment must be rendered non; and cannot be put off. Derrida quotes
Kierkegaard to the effect that "the instant of decision is madness." This is the third aporia, as the
decision cannot be sure of all infinite information, rules and conditions which would justify it, nor
can it be a 'response from a privileged historical stand point.ius Hence, in its inescapable finitude, that
the decision must be rendered momentarily and not at some obscure point in the future, it displaces
justice from the 'now' to sometime in the future, but does not discount its 'possibility."'
Where, then, does Derrida leave us on law and justice? Clearly, to him, justice is an ideal to which,
through deconstruction - adopting responsibility and understanding the aporias - we must tend
toward. In his essay on the Force of Lan, Derrida says that justice is impossible,"' and is not
deconstructable. On the other hand, law is deconstructable, and that taken together the possibility of
deconstruction is ensured and that finally deconstruction it justice." However, Balkin argues that
taken together, these statements yield a contradiction. This is because on one hand, deconstruction is
possible (the deconstructability of law and the indeconstructability of justice taken together), and on
the other, deconstruction is impossible (because deconstruction is justice, and justice is impossible)."'
What Derrida was most probably trying to say, is that if the deconstructability of law and the
indeconstructability of justice both make deconstruction possible, then deconstruction would happen
in the interval that separates the deconstructability of law from the indeconstructability of justice, 20
For Derrida, herein lies the possibility of justice; through the aporetic experience of the impossible.
Clearly, such an experience can only be one of madness (Like the instant of decision), and just as
modernism banishes any such situation from mainstream legal understanding,"' the madness at the
margins is justices' real hope.'
The aporetic experience of the impossible is also the most commanding answer to the modernist
rejection of postmodernity - the seductive comfort of nihilism is abandoned for the tension of
continuously seeking alternatives. But by pushing ahead the possibility of justice as 'a venir'(to come),

115 BnoONAMNANSupra note 98, at 173.
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Foac Of Law, Supra note 91, at 945.
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JM. Balkin, Being jurt sith Deconstrucion, 3 SocrA. AND LEGUASTuDIEs 393 availe
articles/beinviustslhtml> (last visited October 10, 2003).

awwaledlawweb/blkainf

2'
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As was shown in the theories of Foucault, in the preceding Part, with particular regard to how extraordinary
interpretations suffer from the pain of runaway signification, and hence are banished from legal understanding
m Madness has an additional meaning in postmodernity, though not particularly relevant here. This stems from extreme
skepticism that guides postrnodernism'a rejection of modern legal theories which attempted to use sociology and
economics to shape the law, and has been described as 'paranoia.' Francis J Moot%III, The ParanoidStle in Contermporary
Legal/ cbolarsbip,31 Hous. L REv. 873 (1994)
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he fails to answer his own question - that of how to work for justice in our times. One could only
speculate here that Derrida, of the ever-changing flux, willed local solutions to different legal
problems, given different sets of norms, histories, influences, authorities, and etcetera.

V

Conclusion: Towards a Postmodern Jurisprudence?

In the preceding sections, an attempt has been made to outline the role of two significant poststructuralist thinkers, namely Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida in constructing a critique of law.
This was depicted in the mapping of power for the former, and the law's relationship with justice for
the latter, as well as their impact on interpretative theory. In this concluding section, an attempt is
made to show how their work and the larger postaodernist enterprise have affected legal scholarship.
It is also attempted to explore the move in recent years, towards creating some kind of a
postmodernist jurisprudence in order to fit in with current philosophical trends.
Among recent legal movements, the CdcalLegal Studies Movement, commonly referred to as CLS, has
been considerably influenced by the postmodernist way of thought.12 3 Begun somewhat in the late
1970's, as a result of a conference of the faculties of US law schools, and a mood of disillusionment
that prevailed all around, the CLS movement challenged the traditional or formalistic picture of legal
development present in America since the 1920's."' Through critical interrogation of the social
phenomena of law, the CLS found different problematic characterizations, such as the person, the
text, the liberal ascription of rights, and the meaning of law's claims and effects.' Wayne Morrison,
author of Juriprudence:From the Greeks to Postmodernism, says that for some part, CLS was an 'expression
of angst' In other words, it was the coming to terms of the legal academia with the end of modernity;
to see all the poverty, irrationality, corruption and violence of the world and to be able to ask the
question that there must be something wrong with a legal system which says that everything is fine as
it is - that status quo must be maintained.
Before postmodernism, CS drew upon Marxism'
(Marx, Gramsci, the Frankfurt School") and
Legal Realism (an early Twentieth Century jurisprudential movement that brought out the
indeterminacy of law.)'2 Upon postmodern influence, many CLS members, in addition to using
Marxist and Realist themes, began to speak about 'deconstruction,"
and 'critical legal history'.'
Hence, for CLS arrived the postmodern tool of making visible the hidden strings which held up, or
shaped a discourse.

m. Licarnz, Supra note 52, at 62.
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Apart from CLS in America, other prominent schools of thought that postmodern theory has
influenced includes the Law and Literature movement. This school argues that law is simply another
narrative, just one more story, and judges employ their own logic while pretending to utilize
precedents and statutes."' Another school so influenced is LegalSemdoics, which utilized the notion of
self as created by symbol systems to demystify legal doctrines.2 3 In addition, many legal theorists
straddled the divide between postmodernism as a social theory and adapted it for understanding legal
discourse.' 4 Scholars like Balkin drew from Nietzsche and Foucault to show the manner in which
external factors, beyond those actors visible on a plain reading, influenced legal classifications/
categories and thinking.' Others in this group include Drucilla Cornell (who edited Deconstruction and
the Posaibihy of Jusice) and Peter Goodrich.
Indeed, at many times efforts has been made to group these movements together, add a couple of
legal theorists who've written critically, and claim the entrance of postmodern jurisprudence.'- The
attempt is dearly a misrepresentation of both postmodern theory, and an understanding of
jurisprudence. To be a jurisprudential theory, any formulation must dwell, at least minimally, on a
blueprint for what the law should be. However, postmodernism, via Foucault and Derrida merely
continuously engages in the critique of law, questioning its origins, it traditions, and its legitimacy
Furthermore it operates at the margins and hence is placed in a position where it cannot suggest any
reform - for such reform can only be superficial, and the foundations/fundamentals which. the
postmodernists attack will remain. The madness at the margins, the term Pve used above to describe
the experience of the impossible, cannot become the casual pursuit of simply rectifying law since it
would then cease to be a postmodern critique of law.
Hence, criticism wedded to undecidability becomes postmodemisrn's most valued characteristic, and
most disappointing failure. Consider the following analogy A traveler on the highway is told that the
path she is pursuing is problematic, but the speaker also admits that she may hi incorrect and, at any rate,
which is a better path is not very clear either. This is the ambiguity that confronts our postmodern
fives. The only hope is that the ambiguity will preclude the commission of the grossly incorrect,
perhaps more aptly defined as the grossly inhuman, examples of which can include those as disparate
as the Holocaust and contemporary representations of neo-imperialism. Though neither Foucault nor
Derrida explicitly mention the phrase, it is precisely this human spirit that informs both their writings,
and to which they both committed their endeavors."'
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Madness atthe Margines'
In the end, the one manner in which the postmodern critique of law can be utilized is to link it up
with some sort of a programme for change (as distinct from mere reform), one which does not
simply capitulate to distinctions between superficial interpretations of terminologies, but continuously
addresses the general rules of the game. In this manner, the traveller acknowledges the possibility of
error on her part, but both the traveler and the speaker are engaged in an effort to find alternative
roads and to move forward (and backwards) ceaselessly, in the hope of rendering justice possible.
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